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Efficient File Sharing in Electronic Health
Records?
Clémentine Gritti, Willy Susilo, Thomas Plantard
Centre for Computer and Information Security Research
School of Computer Science and Software Engineering
University of Wollongong, Australia
cjpg967@uowmail.edu.au, {wsusilo,thomaspl}@uow.edu.au
Abstract. The issue of handling electronic health records have become
paramount interest to the practitioners and security community, due to
their sensitivity. In this paper, we propose a framework that enables
medical practitioners to securely communicate among themselves to dis-
cuss health matters, and the patients can be rest assured that the in-
formation will only be made available to eligible medical practitioners.
Specifically, we construct a new cryptographic primitive to enable File
Sharing in Electronic Health Records (FSEHR). This primitive enables
doctors to read the information sent by the hospital, or by any other in-
dividuals (such as patients’ health records), when the doctors have their
‘license’ validated by that given hospital. We construct such a crypto-
graphic primitive and capture its security requirements in a set of security
models. Subsequently, we present a concrete scheme, which is proven se-
lectively chosen-ciphertext security (CCA-1) secure under the Decisional
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DBDHE) assumption and fully collu-
sion resistant.
Keywords: File Sharing, Electronic Health Records, Broadcast Encryption,
Certificate-Based Encryption, Bilinear map, Chosen-Ciphertext Security.
1 Introduction
Electronic Health Records (EHR) have become of paramount interest to practi-
tioners and security community, due to their data size as well as their security
issues and sensitivity. In the existing literature, there have been a number of
papers [9, 12, 13, 2] that discuss the way to secure this type of data. In this
work, we take a new direction by proposing a framework that enables secure
communication among medical practitioners. The communication channel en-
abled here will allow medical practitioners, i.e. medical doctors, to communicate
among themselves as well as to review the patients’ EHRs. Additionally, it also
allows the hospital to broadcast any important information to the doctors who
are working in that hospital, and this information will only be made available to
? This work is partially supported by the Australian Linkage Project LP120200052.
them. The issue is the fact that the doctors have their own rights in a hospital,
delivered by the government or the medical legislators. Therefore, our framework
should be able to specify which are the doctors that have access to the data by
updating their license as authorized in that hospital. To generalize this scenario,
we decouple several entities involved in this scenario, namely the hospital (as the
data owner), the government and the other medical legislators, who grant the li-
cense for the doctors to work in that hospital. This scenario is depicted in Figure
1. We note that the hospital would be the entity that generates the encrypted
data for the doctors, which includes all important information that the doctors
need to know. Additionally, any other members (such as the nurse or any other
entities outside the doctors) should also be able to send any information to the
group of doctors in that hospital. This is to represent a case for instance when
a patient provides his/her X-ray or blood test results to the hospital.
Our Work. Based on the above scenario, we present a new cryptographic
notion called File Sharing in Electronic Health Records (FSEHR). In this system,
there are four entities, namely the Group Manager (GM), a group of Certificate
Authorities (CA), or simply of Certifiers, a set of doctors and the rest of the
universe. The GM represents an entity such as the hospital in this scenario. A
CA represents the government, the medical institute or other medical legislator
who grants the rights to some doctors to work in a given hospital. The set of
doctors is denoted as a set of users, Ui, who are the main players in this setting.
The rest of the universe includes the patients, nurses, and any other players
who are not captured in the above set of entities. The scenario of the FSEHR
primitive is depicted in Figure 1. In this work, we provide a sound security model
to capture this scenario.
One may think that FSEHR could be achieved easily by combining the two
cryptographic primitives, namely certificate-based encryption and broadcast en-
cryption schemes. Unfortunately this is false. The primary difficulty of achieving
such a scheme is due to the need to achieve a shorter ciphertext, in comparison to
merely combining the ciphertexts into one to achieve a linear size. Furthermore,
the notion of certificate-based encryption usually allows a sender to interact with
only a single receiver, with the help of a CA. Hence, it is clear that by a simple
combination of the existing certificate-based encryption scheme and a broadcast
encryption will lead a construction with a linear size of ciphertext (in number
of both users and certifiers), which is undesirable (otherwise, it would be better
for the broadcaster to just simply encrypt each ciphertext individually for each
user). Moreover, we require that a FSEHR scheme to be fully collusion resistant,
which follows the original notion of broadcast encryption schemes. Hence, even
if all the users in the system collude, only the users in the selected subset with
valid certificates can recover the plaintext.
Related Work. Modelling and securing authorization and access control to
EHR has become a challenge. In [9], such a model, called Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC), is proposed to inscrease the patient privacy and confidential-
ity of his data but it remains flexible to allow specific situations (for instance,
emergency cases). A literature review about security and privacy in EHR can be
found in [2].
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Fig. 1. A hospital H (GM) generates and sends the public/secret key pairs
(P Ki,SKi) for doctor Ui, where i = 1, · · · ,n. The government, the medical insti-
tute and the other medical legislators Lj (CAs) create their public/secret key pairs
(P Kl1 ,SKl1 ),(P Kl2 ,SKl2 ),(P Kl3 ,SKl3 ), · · · ,(P Klk ,SKlk ) respectively. The legisla-
tors then compute and give the certificates Certifi,j,l for doctor Ui, where i = 1, · · · ,n,
j = 1, · · · ,k, and time period T . Finally, a hospital staff member (Universe), for instance
a nurse N , selects a subgroup of doctors Sd = {Ui1 , · · · ,Ui|Sd|} and a subgroup of leg-
islators Sl, encrypts a message M for doctors in Sd, legislators in Sl and time period
T , and sends the resulting ciphertext CT . Only a doctor Uii′ in Sd, with certificate
Certifi,j,l valid at time period T and where Lj ∈ Sl, can recover M.
Benaloh et al. [3] combined a Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE)
and a searchable encryption to obtain a privacy-preserving and patient-centered
EHR system. However, the patients have to create and manage manifold keys and
check the credentials of the healthcare providers (doctors, nurses, ...). Narayan et
al. [10] proposed an EHR system using a broadcast Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption (bCP-ABE) scheme, a variant of ABE system, and a Public
key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) scheme. Their system is secure,
allows private search on health records by performing keyword matching without
leaking information, and enable direct revocation of user access without having
to re-encrypt the data. But the system is only designed for online access control.
More recently, Akinyele et al. [1] presented a system along with a mobile app for
iPhone for secure offline access to EHRs. They constructed their scheme based
on ABE (Key-Policy and Ciphertext-Policy versions) and they developped a
corresponding software library to help the implementation.
2 Preliminaries and Definitions
2.1 File Sharing in Electronic Health Records (FSEHR)
A File Sharing system in Electronic Health Records (FSEHR) comprises four
algorithms (Setup,Certif,Encrypt,Decrypt):
1. Setup(λ,n,k) run by the group manager, takes as inputs the security pa-
rameter λ, the total number n of users, and the total number k of cerfitiers,
output the public parameters PK, the public/secret key pair (PKi,SKi)
for user i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}. The public/secret key pair (PKcj ,SKcj ) are inde-
pendently generated by the certifier j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}. We assume that n is the
bound of the universe, in order to pre-compute public/secret key pairs and
allow users to join the system later.
2. Certif(PK,(PKcj ,SKcj ),PKi, l) run by the certifier j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, takes
as inputs the public parameters PK, the certifier j’s public/secret key pair
(PKcj ,SKcj ), the public key PKi for user i∈ {1, · · · ,n}, and the time period
l, output the certificate Certifi,j,l for i, j and l.
3. Encrypt(PK,Su,Sc,{PKi : i ∈ Su},{PKcj : j ∈ Sc}, l), run by the sender
belonging to the universe, takes as inputs the public parameters PK, the
subset Su of users selected by the sender such that Su⊆{1, · · · ,n}, the subset
Sc of certifiers selected by the sender such that Sc ⊆ {1, · · · ,k}, the public
keys PKi for users i∈ Su, the certifier’s public key PKcj for certifers j ∈ Sc,
and the time period l, output the header Hdr and the session key K.
4. Decrypt(PK,Su,Sc, l,(PKi,SKi),{Certifi,j,l : j ∈ Sc},Hdr) run by user i,
takes as inputs the public parameters PK, the subset Su of users selected by
the sender, the subset Sc of certifiers selected by the sender, the time period
l, the public/secret key pair (PKi,SKi) and the certificates Certifi,j,l for
user i and certifier j ∈ Sc, and the header Hdr, output the session key K if
i ∈ Su and Certifi,j,l is valid for time period l; otherwise ⊥.
We require that for user i ∈ {1, · · · ,n} and certifier j ∈ {1, · · · ,k} such that
(PK,(PKi,SKi),(PKcj ,SKcj ))← Setup(λ,n,k), and subsets Su ∈ {1, · · · ,n}
and Sc ∈ {1, · · · ,k}: if user i ∈ Su, certifier j ∈ Sc and Certifi,j,l is valid for
time period l, then K ← Decrypt(PK,Su,Sc, l,(PKi,SKi),{Certifi,j,l : j ∈
Sc},Encrypt(PK,Su,Sc,{PKi : i∈Su},{PKcj : j ∈Sc}, l)); otherwise ⊥←De-
crypt(PK,Su,Sc, l,(PKi,SKi),{Certifi,j,l : j ∈Sc},Encrypt(PK,Su,Sc,{PKi :
i ∈ Su},{PKcj : j ∈ Sc}, l)).
We call the header, Hdr, as the encryption of the session key K. We call the
full header as the header Hdr along with the descriptions of the set Su of users
and the set Sc of certifiers selected by the sender. Without losing generalization,
we only consider the header Hdr when discussing the size of the scheme.
2.2 Security Requirements
We first present the definitions for chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) and chosen-
ciphertext attack (CCA) securities. We adopt the security definitions from the
certificate-based encryption [7]. There are two basic attacks which may be launced
by an uncertified user or by the certifier. These are captured in the following two
distinct games. In Game 1, the adversary plays the role of an uncertified user:
it first proves that it knows the secret key of the uncertified user and then, it
can make Decryption and Certification queries. In Game 2, the adversary plays
the role of a trusted certifier: it first proves that it knows the secret key of the
certifier and then, it can make Decryption queries. Eventually, we say that the
FSEHR system is secure if no adversary can win either game.
Game 1. Setup. The challenger runs the algorithm Setup(λ,n,k) to obtain
the public parameters PK, the public keys PKi for users i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, and the
public keys PKcj for certifiers j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, and gives them to A1.
Certification Query Phase. For time period l, for user i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, and for
j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, the challenger first checks that SKi is the secret key correspond-
ing to the public key PKi. If so, it runs Certif and returns Certifi,j,l to the
adversary A1; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Decryption Query Phase. For time period l, for user i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, and for
certifier j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, the challenger first checks that SKi is the secret key corre-
sponding to the public key PKi. If so, it returns Decrypt(PK,Su,Sc, l,(PKi,SKi),
{Certifi,j,l : j ∈ Sc},Hdr) to the adversary A1; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Challenge. For time period l∗, A1 outputs a challenge set S∗u ⊆ {1, · · · ,n}. For
user i∈S∗u, the challenger first checks that SK∗i is the secret key corresponding to
the public key PK∗i . If so, it chooses a set S∗c ⊆ {1, · · · ,k} and a random bit b∈R
{0,1}, and runs (Hdr∗,K∗)← Encrypt(PK∗,S∗u,S∗c ,{PK∗i : i ∈ S∗u},{PK∗cj :
j ∈ S∗c }, l∗). It then sets K∗b =K∗, picks at random K∗1−b in the key space, and
gives (Hdr∗,K∗b ,K∗1−b) to the adversary A1. Otherwise, it gives ⊥.
Guess. The adversary A1 outputs its guess b′ ∈R {0,1} for b and wins the game
if b= b′, (l∗,S∗u,Hdr∗) was not the subject of a valid Decryption query after the
Challenge, and (l∗,S∗u) was not subject of any valid Certification query.
We define A1’s advantage in attacking the File Sharing system in Electronic
Health Records for Game 1 with parameters (λ,n,k) as AdvFSEHRGame1A1,n,k (λ) =
|Pr[b= b′]− 12 |.
Game 2. Setup. The challenger runs the algorithm Setup(λ,n,k) to obtain
the public parameters PK, the public keys PKi for users i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, and the
public keys PKcj for certifiers j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, and gives them to A2.
Decryption Query Phase. For time period l and for certifier j ∈ {1, · · · ,k},
the challenger first checks that SKcj is the secret key corresponding to the public
key PKcj . If so, it returns Decrypt(PK,Su,Sc, l,(PKi,SKi),{Certifi,j,l : j ∈
Sc},Hdr) to the adversary A2; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Challenge. For time period l∗, A2 outputs a challenge set S∗u ⊆ {1, · · · ,n}.
The challenger first checks that SK∗cj is the secret key corresponding to the
public key PK∗cj . If so, it chooses a set S
∗
c ⊆ {1, · · · ,k} such that j ∈ S∗c and a
random bit b ∈R {0,1}, and runs (Hdr∗,K∗)← Encrypt(PK∗,S∗u,S∗c ,{PK∗i :
i ∈ S∗},{PK∗cj : j ∈ S
∗
c }, l∗). It then sets K∗b =K∗, picks at random K∗1−b in the
key space, and gives (Hdr∗,K∗b ,K∗1−b) to the adversary A2. Otherwise, it gives
⊥.
Guess. The adversary A2 outputs its guess b′ ∈R {0,1} for b and wins the game
if b = b′ and (l∗,PK∗cj ,Hdr
∗) was not the subject of a valid Decryption query
after the Challenge.
We define A2’s advantage in attacking the File Sharing system in Electronic
Health Records for Game 2 with parameters (λ,n,k) as AdvFSEHRGame2A2,n,k (λ) =
|Pr[b= b′]− 12 |.
Definition 1. We say that a File Sharing system in Electronic Health Records is
adaptively (t,ε,n,k,qC , qD)-secure if no t-time algorithm A that makes at most
qC Certification queries (in Game 1) and qD = qD1 + qD2 Decryption queries
(in the Game 1 and Game 2 respectively), has non-negligible advantage in either
Game 1 or Game 2, i.e. AdvFSEHRGame1A,n,k (λ) +AdvFSEHRGame2A,n,k (λ)≤ ε.
We also mention the selective CCA security: a selective adversary A provides
the set S∗u ⊆ {1, · · · ,n} that it wishes to be challenged on at the beginning of the
security game.
We then define the Fully Collusion Resistance security, in order to capture
the notion of encryption against arbitrary collusion of users. Let the number of
users n, the number of certifiers k and the security parameter λ be given to the
adversary A and the challenger. The game between the two entities proceeds as
follows:
Game Fully Collusion Resistant
1. The adversary A outputs a set Su,n′ = {u1, · · · ,un′} ⊆ {1, · · · ,n} of colluding
users.
2. The challenger runs the algorithm Setup(λ,n,k) to obtain the public pa-
rameters PK, the keys pairs (PKi,SKi) for users i ∈ Su,n′ , and the keys
pair (PKcj ,SKcj ) for the certifier j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}. It gives (PK,{PKi,SKi :
i ∈ Su,n′},{PKcj : j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}}) to the adversary A and keeps SKcj to
itself. It also runs the algorithm Certif(PK,(PKcj ,SKcj ),PKi, l) to obtain
the certificates Certifi,j,l for user i ∈ Su,n′ , j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, and time period
l, and gives them to the adversary A.
3. The challenger runs the algorithm Encrypt(PK,Su,Sc,{PKi : i∈Su},{PKj :
j ∈ Sc}, l′) for a subset Su ⊆ {1, · · · ,n} such that Su ∩Su,n′ = ∅ and l′ 6= l,
and for a subset Sc ⊆ {1, · · · ,k}, and gives the resulting header Hdr to the
adversary A and keeps the associated session key K to itself.
4. The adversary A outputs K∗←Decrypt(PK,Su,Sc, l′,(f({PKi : i ∈ S′ ⊆
Su,n′}),f({SKi : i∈S′⊆Su,n′})),{f({Certifi,l : i∈S′⊆Su,n′}) : j ∈Sc},Hdr∗)
where f is a function that takes as input public keys, secret keys or certifi-
cates, and outputs a new public key, a new secret key or a new certificate as
a combination of public keys, secret keys or certificates, respectively.
5. The adversary A wins the game if K∗ =K.
Definition 2. We say that a File Sharing system in Electronic Health Records
is fully collusion resistant if no t-time algorithm A has non-negligible advantage
in the above game.
2.3 Broadcast Encryption
A Broadcast Encryption (BE) system [6, 5, 4, 8] is made up of three randomized
algorithms (SetupBE,EncryptBE,DecryptBE) such that:
1. SetupBE(n) takes as input the number of receivers n. It outputs n secret
keys d1, · · · ,dn and a public key PK.
2. EncryptBE(S,PK) takes as inputs a subset S ⊆ {1, · · · ,n} and a public key
PK. It outputs a pair (Hdr,K) where Hdr is called the header and K ∈ K
is a message encryption key chosen from a finite key set K. We will often
refer to Hdr as the broadcast ciphertext.
Let M be a message to be broadcast that should be decipherable precisely
by the receivers in S. Let CM be the encryption of M under the symmetric
key K. The broadcast consists of (S,Hdr,CM ). The pair (S,Hdr) is often
called the full header and CM is often called the broadcast body.
3. DecryptBE(S,i,di,Hdr,PK) takes as inputs a subset S ⊆ {1, · · · ,n}, a user
identity i ∈ {1, · · · ,n} and the secret key di for user i, a header Hdr, and the
public key PK. If i ∈ S, then the algorithm outputs a message encryption
key K ∈K. Intuitively, user i can then use K to decrypt the broadcast body
CM and obtain the message body M .
We require that for all subset S ⊆{1, · · · ,n} and all i∈ S, if (PK,(d1, · · · ,dn))←
SetupBE(n) and (Hdr,K)←EncryptBE(S,PK), then DecryptBE(S,i,di,Hdr,
PK) =K.
2.4 Certificate-Based Encryption
A certificate-updating Certificate-Based Encryption (CBE) system is made up of
six randomized algorithms (GenIBE,GenPKE,Upd1,Upd2,EncryptCBE,De-
cryptCBE) such that:
1. GenIBE(λ1, t) takes as inputs a security parameter λ1 and (optionally) the
total number of time periods t. It outputs SKIBE (the certifier’s master secret
key) and public parameters params that include a public key PKIBE and
the description of a string space S.
2. GenPKE(λ2, t) takes as inputs a security parameter λ2 and (optionally) the
total number of time periods t. It outputs SKPKE and public key PKPKE
(the client’s secret and public keys).
3. Upd1(SKIBE,params, l,s,PKPKE) takes as inputs SKIBE, params, l, string
s ∈ S and PKPKE, at the start of time period l. It outputs Cert′l, which is
sent to the client.
4. Upd2(params, l,Cert′l,Certl−1) takes as inputs params, l, Cert′l and (op-
tionally) Certl−1, at the start of time period l. It outputs Certl.
5. EncryptCBE(params, l,s,PKPKE,M) takes as inputs (params, l,s,PKPKE,
M), where M is a message. It outputs a ciphertext C on message M intended
for the client to decrypt using Certl and SKPKE (and possibly s).
6. DecryptCBE(params,Certl,SKPKE,C, l) takes as inputs (params,Certl,SKPKE,
C) in time period l. It outputs either M or the special case ⊥ indicating fail-
ure.
We require that Decrypt(params,Certl,SKPKE,Encrypt(params, l,s,PKPKE,
M), l) =M for the given params←GenIBE(λ1, t), PK←GenPKE(λ2, t), Certl←
Upd2(params, l,Upd1(SKIBE,params, l,s,PKPKE),Certl−1).
3 An Efficient Construction
Our construction FSEHR is an effective combination of the BGW Broadcast En-
cryption (BE) scheme [4] and the Gentry’s Certificate-Based Encryption (CBE)
scheme [7]. Notice that the Gentry’s CBE scheme is designed for a communi-
cation between one sender and one receiver. Therefore, applying the Gentry’s
CBE scheme directly to the BGW, will lead to the linear size of the headers in
the number of users and of certifiers in the two respective subsets designed by
the sender, which is impractical. However, we managed to overcome this issue
and achieve constant size for header, secret keys and certificates. Moreover, our
scheme FSEHR is proved selective CCA secure using the standard transformation
from the REACT scheme proposed by Okamoto and Pointcheval [11].
Setup(λ,n,k). On input the security parameter λ, the total number n of users,
and the total number k of certifiers, run (p,G,GT ,e)←GroupGen(λ,n,k). Pick
at random g ∈R G and α ∈R Zp, compute gi = g(α
i) for i= 1, · · · ,n,n+2, · · · ,2n.
Pick at random γ ∈R Zp and compute v = gγ . Choose three hash functions
H1 : G×{0,1}∗→G, H2 : G×G→G, and H3 : GT ×G×G×G×G→ {0,1}λ.
For user i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, compute the user’s secret key as di = gγi (= v(α
i)).
Independently, for j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, certifier j computes its own public/secret
key pair as follows: choose at random an exponent σj ∈R Zp and then compute
the public key wj = gσj . Set the secret key as dcj = σj .
Set the public parameters as PK = (p,G,GT ,g,g1, · · · ,gn,gn+2, · · · ,g2n,v,w1,
· · · ,wk,H1,H2,H3).
Certif(PK,dcj , i, l). On input the public parameters PK, the certifier j’s secret
key dcj , the user i, and the time period l represented as a string in {0,1}∗, pick
at random ri,j,l ∈R Zp and compute the user’s certificate ei,j,l = (ei,j,l,1,ei,j,l,2)
as follows:
ei,j,l,1 = g
σj
i ·H1(wj , l)
σj ·ri,j,l(= w(α
i)
j ·H1(wj , l)
σj ·ri,j,l)
ei,j,l,2 = gσj ·ri,j,l(= w
ri,j,l
j )
Encrypt(PK,Su,Sc, l). On input the public parameters PK, a set Su⊆{1, · · · ,n}
of users, a set Sc ⊆ {1, · · · ,k} of certifiers, and the time period l, pick at ran-
dom an exponent t ∈R Zp, compute the session key K = e(gn+1,g)t, and set the
header Hdr = (C1,C2,C3,C4,C5) as follows:
(gt,
∏
j∈Sc
H1(wj , l)t,(v ·
∏
j∈Sc
wj ·
∏
i′∈Su
gn+1−i′)t,H2(C1,C3)t,H3(K,C1,C2,C3,C4))
Decrypt(PK,Su,Sc, l, i,di,ei,j,l,Hdr). On input the public parameters PK, a
set Su ⊆ {1, · · · ,n} of users, a set Sc ⊆ {1, · · · ,k} of certifiers, the time period
l, the user i with its secret key di and its certificates ei,j,l for j ∈ Sc, parsed as
(ei,j,l,1,ei,j,l,2), and the header Hdr parsed as (C1,C2,C3,C4,C5), check whether
e(C1,H2(C1,C3))
?= e(g,C4), and output
K =
e(gi,C3) ·e(
∏
j∈Sc ei,j,l,2,C2)
e(di ·
∏
j∈Sc ei,j,l,1 ·
∏
i′∈Su\{i} gn+1−i′+i,C1)
= e(gn+1,g)t
Then, compute C′5 =H3(K,C1,C2,C3,C4). If C′5 =C5, then return K; otherwise
return ⊥.
Correctness. Notice that g(α
i′ )
i = gi+i′ for any i, i′. At time period l, user
i ∈ Su ⊆ {1, · · · ,n} with secret key di and certificate ei,l,j for j ∈ Sc ⊆ {1, · · · ,k}
decrypts as follows:
K =
e(gi,C3) ·e(
∏
j∈Sc ei,j,l,2,C2)
e(di ·
∏
j∈Sc ei,j,l,1 ·
∏
i′∈Su\{i} gn+1−i′+i,C1)
=
e(g(αi),(v ·
∏
j∈Scwj ·
∏
i′∈Su gn+1−i′)
t) ·e(
∏
j∈Sc g
σj ·ri,j,l ,
∏
j∈ScH1(wj , l)
t)
e(v(αi) ·
∏
j∈Scw
(αi)
j ·H1(wj , l)
σj ·ri,j,l ·
∏
i′∈Su\{i} gn+1−i′+i,g
t)
= e(gn+1,g)t
Performance. In the following table, we evaluate the efficiency of our scheme
FSEHR. We use results of cryptographic operation implementations (exponen-
tiations and pairings) using the MIRACL library, provided by Certivox for the
MIRACL Authentication Server Project Wiki. All the following experiments are
based on Borland C/C++ Compiler/Assembler and tested on a processor 2.4
GHz Intel i5 520M.
For our symmetric pairing-based systems, AES with a 80-bit key and a Super
Singular curve over GFp, for a 512-bit modulus p and an embedding degree equal
to 2, are used. We assume that there are n= 100 users and k = 20 certifiers.
Exponentiation in G Exponentiation in GT Pairings
Time/computation 1.49 0.36 3.34
Algorithms Setup 546,80
Certif 89,40
Encrypt 5,96 0,36 3,34
Decrypt 16,70
Fig. 2. Timings for our symmetric pairing-based system FSEHR. Times are in millisec-
onds.
We note that the total time in the algorithm Setup is substantial, but we recall
that this algorithm should be run only once to generate the public parameters
and the static secret keys for both users and certifiers. In the algorithm Certif,
it requires 89,40 milliseconds because k = 20 certificates are created. Finally,
in the algorithms Encrypt and Decrypt, it takes 9,66 and 16,70 milliseconds
respectively, mainly due to the cost of pairing computations.
4 Security Proofs
Assumption. We prove the security of our scheme FSEHR using the Decisional
n-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DBDHE) assumption, which is as follows.
Definition 3. The (t,n,ε)-BDHE assumption says that for any t-time adver-
sary B that is given (g,h,ga,ga2 , · · · ,gan ,gan+2 , · · · ,ga2n) ∈G2n+1, and a candi-
date to Decisional n-BDHE problem, that is either e(g,h)an+1 ∈GT or a random
value T , cannot distinguish the two cases with advantage greater than ε:
AdvBDHEB,n = |Pr[B(g,h,ga,ga
2
, · · · ,ga
n
,ga
n+2
, · · · ,ga
2n
,e(g,h)a
n+1
) = 1]
−Pr[B(g,h,ga,ga
2
, · · · ,ga
n
,ga
n+2
, · · · ,ga
2n
,T ) = 1]| ≤ ε
Selective CCA Security Proof.
Theorem 1. The File Sharing scheme in Electronic Health Records FSEHR
achieves Selective CCA Security under the Decision n-BDHE assumption, in
the random oracle model.
Proof. We assume there exists an adversary A that breaks the semantic security
of the FSEHR scheme with probability greater than ε within time t, making qH1 ,
qH2 and qH3 random oracle queries, qcf certification queries and qd decryption
queries. Using this adversary A, we build an attacker B for the Decisional n-
BDHE problem in G. B proceeds as follows.
For simplicity, we write gi = g(α
i) for an implicitly defined α. B first takes
as input a Decisional n-BDHE intance (g,h,g1, · · · ,gn,gn+2, · · · ,g2n,Z) where
Z = e(gn+1,h) or Z ∈R GT . B makes use of three random oracles H1, H2 and
H3, and three respective hash lists L1, L2 and L3, initially set empty, to store
all the query-answers.
Init. A outputs a set S∗u ⊆ {1, · · · ,n} of users that it wishes to be challenged on.
Setup. B needs to generate the public parameters PK, the secret keys di for
i /∈ S∗u, and the secret keys dcj for the certifier j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}. It chooses random
elements x,y1 · · · ,yk ∈R Zp, and sets v= gx/
∏
i′∈S∗u
gn+1−i′ , wj = gyj and dcj =
yj for j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}. It then computes
di = gxi /
∏
i′∈S∗u
gn+1−i′+i = gx·(α
i) · (
∏
i′∈S∗u
gn+1−i′)−(α
i) = v(α
i).
Eventually, B givesA the public parameters PK = (p,G,GT ,e,g,g1, · · · ,gn,gn+2,
· · · ,g2n,v,w1, · · · ,wk,H1,H2,H3), where H1, H2 and H3 are controlled by B as
follows:
– Upon receiving a query (wj , lj) to the random oracle H1 for some j ∈ [1, qH1 ]:
• If ((wj , lj),uj ,Uj) exists in L1, return Uj .
• Otherwise, choose uj ∈R Zp at random and compute Uj = guj . Put
((wj , lj),uj ,Uj) in L1 and return Uj as answer.
– Upon receiving a query (W1j ,W2j) to the random oracle H2 for some j ∈
[1, qH2 ]:
• If ((W1j ,W2j),Xj) exists in L2, return Xj .
• Otherwise, choose Xj ∈R G at random. Put ((W1j ,W2j),Xj) in L2 and
return Xj as answer.
– Upon receiving a query (Kj ,C1j ,C2j ,C3j ,C4j) to the random oracle H3 for
some j ∈ [1, qH3 ]:
• If ((Kj ,C1j ,C2j ,C3j ,C4j),C5j) exists in L3, return C5j .
• Otherwise, choose C5j ∈R {0,1}λ at random. Put (Kj ,C1j ,C2j ,C3j ,C4j),
C5j) in L3 and return C5j as answer.
Phase 1. B answers A’s queries as follows.
1. Upon receiving a Certification query (PKi′ ,di, li′) for some i∈ {1, · · · ,n} and
i′ ∈ [1, qcf ]:
– If ((wi′,j , li′),ui′,j ,Ui′,j) exists in L1, return the pair (ui′,j ,Ui′,j) for j ∈
{1, · · · ,k}.
– Otherwise, choose ui′,j ∈R Zp at random, compute Ui′,j = gui′,j , and put
((wi′,j , li′),ui′,j ,Ui′,j) in L1.
Then, pick at random ri,j,li′ ∈R Zp and return the certificate ei,j,li′ where
ei,j,li′ ,1 = g
yj
i · (U
yj
i′,j)
ri,j,li′ = gyj ·(α
i) · (gui′,j )ri,j,li′ ·yj
= gyj ·(α
i) ·H1(wi′,j , li′)
ri,j,li′
·yj = w(α
i)
i′,j ·w
ri,j,li′
·ui′,j
i′,j
ei,j,li′ ,2 = w
ri,j,li′
i′,j
2. Upon receiving a Decryption query (Su,i′ ,Hdri′ , i, li′) for some i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}
and i′ ∈ [1, qd], where Hdri′ = (C1i′ ,C2i′ ,C3i′ ,C4i′ ,C5i′):
– If ((Ki′ ,C1i′ ,C2i′ ,C3i′ ,C4i′),C5i′) exists in L3, do the following:
• Compute H1(wi′,j , li′) using the simulation of H1 as above and check
whether e(C2i′ ,g)
?= e(C1i′ ,
∏
j∈ScH1(wi′,j , li′)) for j ∈Sc⊆{1, · · · ,k}.
If not, return ⊥. Otherwise, compute H2(C1i′ ,C3i′) using the sim-
ulation of H2 as above and check whether e(C1i′ ,H2(C1i′ ,C3i′))
?=
e(g,C4i′). If not, return ⊥. Otherwise, check whether Ki′ is equal or
not to
e(gi,C3i′) ·e(g,C2i′)
e(gx+sumj∈Scyi ·
∏
j∈ScH1(wi′,j , li′),C1i′)
.
If the above equation holds, return Ki′ . Otherwise, return ⊥.
– Else, return ⊥.
Challenge. B generates the challenge on the challenge set S∗u as follows. First,
B sets C∗1 = h and searchs in L1 to get u that corresponds to (wj , l) such that j ∈
Sc ⊆ {1, · · · ,k}. Then, it computes C∗2 = hu. It also computes C∗3 = h
x+
∑
j∈Sc
y.
Informally, we write h = gt for an unknown t ∈ Zp. Then, it randomly chooses
an exponent z ∈R Zp, and sets C∗4 = hz = H2(C∗1 ,C∗3 )t . Second, it randomly
chooses a bit b ∈R {0,1} and sets Kb = Z and picks a random Kb−1 in GT . It
also picks C∗5 ∈R {0,1}∗ at random, and sets C∗5 = H3(Kb,C∗1 ,C∗2 ,C∗3 ,C∗4 ). Fi-
nally, it returns (Hdr∗ = (C∗1 ,C∗2 ,C∗3 ,C∗4 ,C∗5 ),K0,K1) as the challenge to A.
When Z = e(gn+1,h), then (Hdr∗,K0,K1) is a valid challenge for A’s point
of view, as in the real attack. Indeed, if we write h= gt for an unknown t ∈ Zp,
then
h
x+
∑
j∈Sc
y = hx ·
∏
j∈Sc
hyj ·
(∏
i′∈S∗u
gn+1−i′∏
j∈S∗u
gn+1−i′
)t
= gt·x ·
∏
j∈Sc
gt·yj ·
(∏
i′∈S∗u
gn+1−i′∏
j∈S∗u
gn+1−i′
)t
=
 gx∏
i′∈S∗u
gn+1−i′
·
∏
j∈Sc
gyj ·
∏
i′∈S∗u
gn+1−i′
t = C∗3
Therefore, by definition, Hdr∗ is a valid encryption of the session key e(gn+1,g)t.
Moreover, e(gn+1,g)t = e(gn+1,h) = Z =Kb, and thus (Hdr∗,K0,K1) is a valid
challenge to A. When Z ∈R GT , then K0 and K1 are random independent ele-
ments in GT .
Phase 2. B responds to the Certification and Decryption queries as in Phase
1. We note that if (K∗b ,C∗1 ,C∗2 ,C∗3 ,C∗4 ) is asked to the random oracle H3, the
value C∗5 created in the simulation of the Challenge is returned.
Guess. The adversary A outputs its guess b′ ∈R {0,1} for b.
Analysis. In the simulations of the secret key generation and the certificate
generation, the responses to A are perfect.
The simulation of the random oracle H1 is not entirely perfect. Let QueryH1
be the event that A has queried before the Challenge phase (w∗j , l∗) to H1 for
j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}. Except for the case above, the simulation of H1 is perfect. This
event happens with probability k/p.
The simulation of the random oracles H2 and H3 are not entirely perfect.
Let QueryH2 and QueryH3 be the events that A has queried before the Chal-
lenge phase (C∗1 ,C∗3 ) to H2 and (K∗b ,C∗1 ,C∗2 ,C∗3 ,C∗4 ) to H3. Except for the cases
above, the simulations of H2 and H3 are perfect. These two events happen with
probability 1/p and 1/2λ respectively.
The simulation of the Decryption oracle is nearly perfect, but a valid header
can be rejected sometimes. Indeed, in the simulation of the Decryption oracle, if
(K,C1,C2,C3,C4) has not been queried to H3, then the header is rejected. This
leads to two cases:
1. A uses the value C∗5 , which is part of the challenge, as a part of its Decryption
query.
2. A has guessed a right value for the output of H3 without querying it.
However, in the first case, since (C∗1 ,C∗2 ,C∗3 ,C∗4 ) and Kb are provided as input
to H3, the Decryption query that A would ask is the same as the challenge,
which is not allowed to query. The second case may happen but with negligible
probability 1/2k. Let DecO denote the event that A correctly guesses the output
of H3. Therefore, if B does not correctly guess the output of H3, A’s point of
view in the simulation is identical to the one in the real attack.
Thus, we have Pr[B(g,g1, · · · ,gn,gn+2, · · · ,g2n,h) = e(gn+1,h)] = |Pr[b′ =
b|¬QueryH1∧¬QueryH2∧¬QueryH3∧¬DecO]− 12 | By definition of A, we
have |Pr[b′= b]− 12 |>ε−Pr[QueryH1]−Pr[QueryH2]−Pr[QueryH3]−Pr[DecO].
Hence, we have
|Pr[b′ = b|¬QueryH1∧¬QueryH2∧¬QueryH3∧¬DecO]−
1
2 |
> |Pr[b′ = b]−Pr[QueryH1]−Pr[QueryH2]−Pr[QueryH3]−Pr[DecO]−
1
2 |
> ε−Pr[QueryH1]−Pr[QueryH2]−Pr[QueryH3]−Pr[DecO]
Since A makes qH1 , qH2 and qH3 random oracle queries during the attack,
Pr[QueryH1] ≤ kqH1/p, Pr[QueryH2] ≤ qH2/p and Pr[QueryH3] ≤ qH3/2λ.
In the same way, sinceAmakes qd Decryption queries during the attack, Pr[DecO]
≤ qd/2λ. Therefore, we have B’s winning probability ε′>ε−
k·qH1+qH2
p −
qd+qH3
2λ .
Fully Collusion Resistance Proof.
Theorem 2. The File Sharing scheme in Electronic Health Records FSEHR is
fully secure against any number of colluders, in the random oracle model.
Proof. We assume there exists an adversary A that breaks the semantic security
of the FSEHR scheme with probability greater than ε when interacting with an
algorithm B.
A chooses a subset Su,n′ = {u1, · · · ,un′}⊆{1, · · · ,n} of colluding users. B then
runs Setup(λ,n,k), provides the public parameters PK = (p,G,GT ,g,g1, · · · ,gn,
gn+2, · · · ,g2n,v,w1, · · · ,wk,H1,H2,H3), the secret keys di = v(α
i) for user i ∈
Su,n′ to A, and keeps secret the certifier’s secret keys dcj = σj for j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}.
It also runs Certif(PK,dcj , i, l) and gives the certificate ei,j,l = (ei,j,l,1 =w
(αi)
j ·
H1(wj , l)σj ·ri,j,l ,ei,j,l,2 = w
ri,j,l
j ) to A for user i ∈ Su,n′ , j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, and time
period l.
Afterwards, B chooses a subset S ⊆{1, · · · ,n} of users such that S∩Su,n′ = ∅,
time period l′ 6= l, and set Sc⊆{1, · · · ,k}. It outputs (Hdr,K)←Encrypt(PK,S,
Sc, l), gives Hdr = (C1 = gt,C2 =
∏
j∈ScH1(wj , l)
t,C3 = (v ·
∏
j∈Scwj ·
∏
i′∈S
gn+1−i′)t,C4 = H2(C1,C3)t,C5 = H3(K,C1,C2,C3,C4)) to A and keeps secret
the session key K = e(gn+1,g)t.
A computes new secret key dχ and certificate eχ,j,l from the secret keys
and certificates of users in Su,n′ that it previously obtained as follows. First, A
defines a subset Su,n̄ ⊆ Su,n′ , and sets
dχ =
∏
i′∈Su,n̄
di′ = v
∑
i′∈Su,n̄
αi
′
= vfχ(α)
eχ,j,l,1 =
∏
i′∈Su,n̄
ei′,j,l,1 = w
∑
i′∈Su,n̄
αi
′
j ·H1(wj , l)
σj ·
∑
i′∈Su,n̄
ri′,j,l
= wfχ(α)j ·H1(wj , l)
σj ·rχ,j,l
eχ,j,l,2 = w
∑
i′∈Su,n̄
ri′,j,l
j = w
rχ,j,l
j
where fχ(α) =
∑
i′∈Su,n̄ α
i′ . For a user i belonging to S, it has to cancel out the
following terms
e(g,(v(αi) ·
∏
j∈Scw
(αi)
j ·
∏
i′∈S\{i} gn+1−i′+i)t)
e(vfχ(α) ·
∏
j∈Scw
fχ(α)
j ·
∏
i′∈S\{i} gn+1−i′+i,g
t)
=
e(g,v(αi) ·
∏
j∈Scw
(αi)
j )
e(vfχ(α) ·
∏
j∈Scw
fχ(α)
j ,g)∏
j∈Sc e(g
σj ·rχ,j,l ,
∏
j∈ScH1(wj , l
′)t)∏
j∈Sc e(H1(wj , l)
σ·rχ,j,l ,gt) =
e(g,
∏
j∈ScH1(wj , l
′))
e(
∏
j∈ScH1(wj , l),g)
In the first equality, the two terms vαi−fχ(α) and wα
i−fχ(α)
j should be wiped out.
Thus, one wants to have fχ(α) =
∑
i′∈Su,n̄ α
i′ = αi mod p. In other words, α is
one root of the polynomial P (x) =
∑
i′∈Su,n̄∪{i}x
i′ of degree n̄+1. This happens
with probability Pr[fχ(α) = αi mod p]≤ (n̄+1)/p. In the second equality, if we
suppose that l 6= l′, j,j′ ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, and the hash function H1 is a random oracle,
then the probability that the two outputs are equal Pr[H1(wj′ , l′) =H1(wj , l)]≤
1/p. Finally, A has negligible advantage AdvFSEHRA,n,k ≤ (n̄+2)/p to retrieve
the session key K.
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